European Union - Antitrust Investigation into Meta

Overview

The European Commission announced on 4 December 2025 that it has opened a formal antitrust investigation into Meta's new policy regarding access by artificial intelligence (AI) providers to WhatsApp's Business Solution/API. The Commission's announcement is available on the Commission press corner and the Commission's competition pages: Commission press release (4 December 2025). The inquiry will assess whether the policy update — which the Commission reports was announced in October 2025 and which phases in restrictions for new and existing providers (new providers affected since 15 October 2025; existing providers from 15 January 2026) — could prevent third-party AI assistants from offering services via WhatsApp across the EEA while Meta's own AI remains accessible. The formal investigation covers the EEA except Italy, where the national competition authority is pursuing parallel proceedings. The Commission has framed the investigation under EU competition law (Article 102 TFEU and related procedural rules) and flagged that it may consider interim measures if necessary to prevent irreparable harm to competition in the AI market.

Definitions

For the purposes of this investigation entry the following definitions are used: "WhatsApp Business Solution/API" — the interface and terms that allow businesses and third-party providers to communicate with WhatsApp users for business messaging; "AI providers/AI assistants" — third-party services offering conversational or generative AI functionality (chatbots, virtual assistants) that can be integrated into messaging platforms to interact with customers; "Meta AI" — Meta Platforms' in‑house AI assistant/service integrated into WhatsApp; "EEA" — the European Economic Area (EU Member States plus EFTA states where applicable); "abuse of dominance" — conduct prohibited by Article 102 TFEU where an undertaking with a dominant market position exploits or excludes competitors (examples include discrimination, tying, refusal to supply or other exclusionary practices).

Governance and Institutional Framework

The investigation is led by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition (DG Competition) and draws on the Commission's powers under EU competition law (see Article 102 TFEU and implementing regulations available at EUR-Lex Article 102 and Commission implementing rules). The Commission exercises investigative powers (requests for information, inspections, and the ability to seek interim measures) and coordinates with national competition authorities through the European Competition Network (ECN). Italy's AGCM has opened parallel proceedings in 2025; the Commission's formal investigation specifically excludes Italy to avoid overlap with those national proceedings. The Commission’s public notice sets out the scope and the legal basis for the probe: DG Competition - Latest News and the Commission presscorner release provide the official public record.

Key Focus Areas

The investigation focuses on several competition law questions, including (i) whether Meta holds a dominant position in app-based communication services and whether it has leveraged that position to foreclose competitors in adjacent AI assistant markets; (ii) whether the policy update amounts to discriminatory conditions between Meta's own AI and third-party AI providers (dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions); (iii) whether the policy constitutes tied selling or conditional access that forces market players to accept supplementary obligations unrelated to the business messaging service; (iv) the policy’s actual and likely effects on market entry, innovation and consumer choice for businesses relying on conversational AI via messaging; and (v) the technical and operational justifications Meta advances (e.g., system strain) and whether these are proportionate and non-discriminatory. The Commission will analyse market shares, barriers to entry, multi-sided platform effects, interoperability and technical constraints, as well as evidence from complainants (including small business stakeholders) and third parties about competitive impact.

Implementation Framework

Under Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and related procedures, the Commission will gather evidence (requests for information, document requests, possible inspections), invite statements of defense from Meta, and may open an in-depth investigation if preliminary facts suggest an infringement. The Commission's process allows for remedies through commitments or, if infringement is established, decisions imposing behavioural or structural remedies and fines. The procedural steps include (i) formal opening of the investigation; (ii) fact and market analysis; (iii) requests for information and cooperation by the undertaking; (iv) potential interim measures application where irreparable harm is likely; and (v) a decision or referral. The Commission's notice on best practices for Articles 101 and 102 proceedings and the procedural regulations (Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004) set out rights of defense and investigative powers. Meta is expected to cooperate under the Commission's investigatory powers, including preservation of evidence and provision of requested documentation.

Monitoring and Evaluation

The Commission will monitor market developments and the effects of the contested policy on market access for third-party AI providers, including by soliciting input from affected businesses, trade associations and other stakeholders. Monitoring includes technical analysis of the WhatsApp Business API access conditions, logs and interoperability constraints (subject to confidentiality protections), and economic assessment of market impact. The Commission may engage external experts where necessary and coordinate with national authorities (for example AGCM in Italy) and relevant sectoral regulators to gather a comprehensive evidence base. Monitoring will also consider any interim measures imposed and their effectiveness in preventing anti-competitive harm while the case proceeds.

Penalties, Liability, and Appeals

If the Commission concludes that Meta has abused a dominant position, it may adopt a decision requiring cessation of the infringement, impose behavioural or structural remedies (e.g., non-discriminatory access obligations) and levy fines up to 10% of worldwide annual turnover for infringements of Article 102 TFEU. The Commission can also impose periodic penalty payments for non-compliance with remedies. Parties subject to a Commission decision have the right to appeal to the General Court of the European Union and subsequently to the Court of Justice on points of law. National competition authorities may also pursue remedies or interim measures under national law in parallel where permitted by EU rules.

Relationship to Other Instruments

The investigation is conducted under traditional EU competition law rather than the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA); however, the Commission will consider any overlaps with DMA obligations for designated gatekeepers where relevant facts intersect. The Commission’s action also complements national competition inquiries such as the AGCM's proceedings in Italy. The case may touch on data protection and sectoral rules (e.g., aspects of the Digital Services Act, DMA, and national data protection supervision) where data processing practices and the interplay of platform rules with user rights are relevant, requiring coordination with other EU and national authorities where legal issues overlap.

International Alignment

The Commission's investigation occurs in a global context where other jurisdictions (including member states’ regulators and non-EU regulators) are scrutinising the market behaviour of large technology platforms integrating AI. The Commission may exchange information with other competition authorities through bilateral and multilateral channels and the International Competition Network where procedural rules permit. The Commission has signalled awareness of international trade sensitivities but pursues enforcement grounded in EU competition law and the protection of the internal market. Parallel inquiries (for example, Italy’s AGCM) are being coordinated to minimise conflicts and duplication.

Implementation Timeline

Sources and References