Latvia - Criminalising Deepfake Use (90.1/2024)

Overview

The Amendments to the Criminal Law (introducing Article 90.1) were adopted by the Saeima on 9 May 2024 and entered into force on 22 May 2024. The amendments criminalise the manufacture and dissemination of intentionally false, discrediting information produced using deepfake ("dziļviltojuma") technologies about political organisations or candidates if the acts occur during the legally defined pre-election campaigning period or on election day. The law also adds criminal liability where such acts are carried out by automated data processing systems aimed at obstructing participation in elections, referendums or European Citizens’ Initiatives. For the official parliamentary announcement see Saeima press release (9 May 2024) and for an accessible summary and entry-into-force information see LV Portāls (22 May 2024).

Definitions

Key statutory definitions are provided or clarified in the drafting and accompanying explanatory notes. "Deepfake"/"dziļviltojums" is understood to include faked or AI/manipulation-generated images, video, or audio that portray a real or realistic-seeming person saying or doing things they did not say or do, or fully synthetic persons created by automated systems. The "pre-election campaign period" is cross-referenced to electoral law and defined as the 120 days prior to election day up to and including election day (with specific rules where elections are re-run or an assembly is dissolved). "Automated data processing system" covers, in the statute's scope, systems using automated algorithms, bots, or other automated means to manage or disseminate content and to influence or obstruct persons’ participation in democratic acts.

Governance and Institutional Framework

Implementation and enforcement fall primarily to criminal justice institutions: investigative functions are exercised by the State Police (Valsts policija) and specialised units where applicable; prosecutions are the responsibility of the Prosecutor’s Office (Ģenerālprokuratūra); and political corruption, financing or high-level interference allegations can engage the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB). The Saeima remains the lawmaker and source of statutory interpretation through parliamentary committee materials. The law’s explanatory notes and parliamentary dossier (Likumprojekts Nr. 535/Lp14) elaborate institutional responsibilities and interplay with election administration authorities. For the Saeima dossier and legislative documents see the Saeima parliamentary database and session materials archived by the official publication Latvijas Vēstnesis session record.

Key Focus Areas

The statute concentrates on several policy objectives: (1) safeguarding the integrity of electoral decision-making by criminalising materially false, reputation-damaging deepfake content targeted at political actors during the pre-election window; (2) deterring and penalising the use of algorithmic/automated systems to suppress or obstruct voters or civic participation; (3) clarifying sanctions and ensuring proportionality of penalties for offences that threaten democratic institutions; (4) creating evidentiary and procedural expectations for prosecutors and investigators in AI/technology-enabled offences; and (5) providing transitional rules for content created before the law’s entry into force. The statute deliberately targets knowingly false and discrediting conduct rather than all synthetic content. It excludes lawful journalistic, satirical or academic uses where no intentional falsehood aimed at discrediting is present. Related policy materials and analyses discuss the threshold for proof of "knowledge" and the operational challenges in attributing authorship of automated dissemination, see the Saeima explanatory notes and public legal commentary from independent law firms and legal periodicals.

Implementation Framework

Operationalising Article 90.1 requires multi-disciplinary capacity: technical forensic capabilities to detect and preserve evidence of synthetic media; legal training for investigators and prosecutors on digital attribution and expert evidence; clear internal protocols for preservation and chain-of-custody of online material; coordination protocols between police, prosecutor’s office and election administration bodies; and guidance for media platforms and intermediaries on cooperation with law enforcement while respecting freedom of expression. The statute does not create an administrative takedown regime but investigators may seek judicial orders for evidence preservation or removal where criminal processes require. Parliamentary materials and government guidance recommend investment in digital forensics and cross-border cooperation to address content hosted or generated outside Latvia. The Saeima's press release and accompanying committee documentation outline the intended prosecutorial approach and references to existing criminal procedure frameworks.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring will combine traditional criminal statistics with qualitative review of case law and internal prosecutorial reports. Key performance indicators include number of complaints received, investigations opened, prosecutions commenced, convictions or acquittals, timeliness of digital evidence preservation actions, and cross-border legal assistance executed. Oversight is through regular reporting by prosecutorial and police authorities to the legislature and through public transparency channels. The law’s designers envisaged periodic evaluation to ensure offences are applied proportionally and that enforcement does not chill legitimate expression or journalistic activity. External researchers and civil society are expected to review implementation and help refine prosecutorial guidance.

Penalties, Liability, and Appeals

The statutory penalty range includes imprisonment (up to five years in aggravated or automated-system cases), temporary deprivation of liberty, probation supervision or community service. Monetary fines were limited or removed from specific aggravated provisions to reflect the gravity attributed to attacks on electoral integrity using automated systems. Liability attaches to authors, producers and intentional distributors; where multiple parties are involved the law contemplates joint liability in line with general principles of criminal law. Defendants retain full criminal procedural protections and may appeal convictions through the ordinary appellate courts; issues of evidentiary sufficiency, expert testimony reliability, and jurisdiction for cross-border digital evidence are likely to be focal points in appeals and jurisprudence.

Relationship to Other Instruments

Article 90.1 complements existing electoral law (which defines campaigning periods and administrative restrictions), data protection obligations (where processing of personal data for synthetic content may implicate the Data State Inspectorate), and other criminal statutes (e.g., fraud, defamation, unlawful interference). It was coordinated with proposed amendments in the Criminal Procedure Code to enable digital evidence handling. The amendment is not designed to replace administrative or civil remedies; rather it provides a criminal backstop for serious, intentional misconduct. Practitioners are advised to consult the Saeima legislative dossier (Likumprojekts Nr. 535/Lp14) and explanatory notes for links to related statutory texts and transitional rules.

International Alignment

Latvia’s approach aligns with wider European concern about AI-driven disinformation and electoral interference. The law references precedent jurisdictions and cross-border incidents noted in parliamentary debate (cases in Argentina, Slovakia and Poland were cited in committee materials). Latvia’s measure sits alongside EU-level proposals on AI safety and digital services regulation and may be invoked in international cooperation for cross-border investigations and mutual legal assistance. The Saeima’s explanatory notes reference alignment with democratic protection principles promoted in EU instruments and encourage cooperation with EU law enforcement and digital platform regulation initiatives.

Implementation Timeline

Sources and References