Singapore - Online Advertising Integrity (2024)

Overview

The Elections (Integrity of Online Advertising) (Amendment) Act 2024 (ELIONA) is a targeted electoral‑integrity statute enacted by the Parliament of Singapore to address digitally generated or manipulated online election advertising (OEA) that misrepresents candidates. Introduced on 9 September 2024 and passed on 15 October 2024, the Act entered into force on 22 January 2025. ELIONA creates a time‑limited prohibition (from the issuance of the Writ to the close of polling) on publishing, boosting, sharing or reposting digitally altered content that realistically depicts a candidate saying or doing something they did not in fact say or do. The measure combines criminal offences with administrative corrective powers for the Returning Officer and imposes heightened obligations on specified social media services under a Code of Practice to be administered by the Infocomm Media Development Authority (MDDI press release). The law complements existing instruments such as POFMA and the Online Criminal Harms Act and aims to protect voters’ ability to make informed choices based on factual representations.

Definitions

Key defined terms in the Act include "online election advertising" (OEA) — information or material published online that can reasonably be regarded as intended to promote, procure or prejudice the electoral prospects of a party or candidate; "digitally generated or manipulated" — any material created or altered wholly or partly by digital means, including generative AI as well as non‑AI editing such as splicing, dubbing or Photoshop; "candidate" — a person officially declared or nominated for the election pursuant to election law; and "realistic enough" — a contextual test whether some members of the public would reasonably believe that the depicted event or utterance occurred. Exemptions are provided for purely private communications, certain authorised news reporting, and content that is manifestly unrealistic (e.g., cartoons or obvious parodies).

Governance and Institutional Framework

The Act operates through a network of institutions. The Elections Department and the Returning Officer (RO) play an operational role in receiving review requests and issuing corrective directions. The Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI) sponsored the Bill and provides policy oversight. The Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) is charged with developing a Code of Practice to set obligations for specified social media services to detect and mitigate manipulated OEA and to report compliance. Enforcement is supported by the Attorney‑General’s Chambers and the criminal justice system where breaches give rise to prosecutorial action. Internet Access Service Providers (ISPs) and platform intermediaries have defined roles to disable access by Singapore users if ordered. This multi‑agency approach embeds administrative corrective measures alongside criminal penalties to allow rapid remediation across technical and legal channels.

Key Focus Areas

ELIONA’s principal focus areas include content definition and scope (identifying when OEA is "digitally generated or manipulated" and "realistic enough"), rapid corrective action during condensed election timelines, platform accountability through a Code of Practice, evidentiary preservation and disclosure obligations, candidate‑led review mechanisms and anti‑abuse safeguards to prevent meritless or dishonest requests. The law is narrowly tailored to the election period because the timing of the issuance of a Writ can compress the window for detection and correction; this is why the RO is empowered with expedited powers and platforms are incentivised to embed preventive safeguards well before an election period. Secondary focus areas include public education and resilience‑building (media literacy), technical research into detection tools, and interagency coordination for cross‑border content takedown or access‑blocking where foreign‑hosted content targets Singapore’s electorate.

Implementation Framework

Implementation requires three complementary streams: legal procedures (RO review, issuance of corrective directions and criminal enforcement), technical operations (platform monitoring, detection tooling, forensic preservation and takedown workflows), and governance instruments (IMDA Code of Practice, platform notices and transparency reporting). Platforms designated under the Code are expected to maintain documented detection and escalation procedures, dedicated contact points for the RO and law enforcement, and mechanisms to disable access to offending content for Singapore users. The RO’s corrective directions must be complied with promptly or risk prosecution; platforms have statutory defences and procedural safeguards available under the Code and the Act. Implementation guidance published by MDDI and IMDA clarifies the interaction between ELIONA and other statutes (e.g., POFMA) and provides step‑by‑step procedures for evidence preservation and disclosure requests during investigations (MDDI guidance).

Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring relies on combined technical detection (automated and human moderation), reporting channels for candidates and the public, and the RO’s casework logs. IMDA’s Code of Practice will require specified social media services to publish annual or periodic safety reports demonstrating detection rates, takedown times, escalation volumes and compliance actions. The Government and civil society stakeholders are expected to evaluate ELIONA’s impact post‑election by reviewing complaint volumes, number of corrective directions issued, time‑to‑take‑down metrics, and any prosecution outcomes. Independent auditing and transparency reporting are recommended to evaluate the law’s deterrence effectiveness and to identify unintended impacts on legitimate expression.

Penalties, Liability, and Appeals

Penalties under the Act distinguish between individuals and specified platform services. Individuals who publish or republish prohibited OEA face fines of up to S$1,000, imprisonment up to 12 months, or both; social media services designated under the Code that fail to comply with corrective directions may face fines of up to S$1,000,000 on conviction. The Act also preserves existing illegal‑practice sanctions for candidates who knowingly make false declarations to the RO (which can include fines or vacation of the election result under the PEA/PrEA). Procedural safeguards include the right to make representations prior to corrective action where practicable, and internal appeal mechanisms overseen by the RO and, where appropriate, judicial review in Singapore’s courts on questions of law and procedural fairness.

Relationship to Other Instruments

ELIONA complements and interfaces with a broader regulatory ecosystem: the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) addresses false statements of fact more generally; the Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA) targets criminal online harms and platform obligations; the Protection from Harassment Act may apply to targeted abusive conduct; and existing election laws (Parliamentary Elections Act 1954 and Presidential Elections Act 1991) provide the structural framework for candidate nominations, illegal practices and electoral remedies. ELIONA is purpose‑limited to digitally manipulated OEA targeting candidates during election periods and does not replace or subsume these other instruments; instead it adds a tailored response for manipulated audiovisual and audio content that present a distinct and acute risk to electoral integrity.

International Alignment

ELIONA’s approach reflects global trends: many jurisdictions are considering or adopting rules to address AI‑generated disinformation and deepfakes in elections. The combination of (a) time‑limited prohibitions tied to electoral cycles, (b) platform accountability instruments (codes or designated‑platform obligations), and (c) rapid administrative corrective powers mirrors policy directions in several OECD and APAC frameworks. ELIONA also signals Singapore’s intent to engage in cross‑border cooperation for takedowns and notices where foreign‑hosted content targets the domestic electorate. At the same time, ELIONA emphasises narrow scope and due process, which helps to align the law with international human‑rights norms on freedom of expression by limiting restrictions to narrowly defined digital manipulations that are realistically deceptive.

Implementation Timeline

Sources and References