Iran - Combating False News (2025)

Overview

The Law on Combating the Spread of Untrue News Content, enacted in early 2025 by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), represents a significant expansion of Iran's regulatory framework over digital communications and the information ecosystem. This legislation was introduced against a backdrop of increasing concerns regarding 'psychological warfare,' social unrest, and the rapid proliferation of AI-generated disinformation on domestic and international social media platforms. The primary objective of the law is to establish a rigorous legal mechanism for identifying, categorizing, and penalizing the creation and dissemination of news content deemed 'untrue' or 'distorted' by state authorities. It specifically targets high-reach influencers, digital news outlets, and automated systems that contribute to the viral spread of information that the state classifies as harmful to national security, public order, or the moral fabric of society. Beyond simple censorship, the law introduces a structured oversight regime that integrates the technical capabilities of the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) with the judicial authority of the Specialized Court for Cybercrimes. It mandates that all digital platforms operating within the jurisdiction—including those accessible via VPNs if they have a substantial Iranian user base—implement proactive monitoring tools. The law is seen as a successor to and an expansion of the Computer Crimes Law of 2009, modernizing the definitions of criminal activity to include deepfakes, botnets, and algorithmic manipulation. By centralizing the definition of 'truth' within the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC), the legislation effectively creates a state-sanctioned monopoly on factual verification, requiring news entities to cross-reference sensitive reports with official government communiqués before publication.

Definitions

The legislation provides a comprehensive, albeit broad, set of definitions intended to cover the full spectrum of modern digital content. 'Untrue News Content' is defined as any information, whether in text, image, audio, or video format, that deviates from documented reality with the intent to mislead the public or cause institutional disruption. A critical addition in this 2025 act is the definition of 'Synthetic Misinformation,' which specifically refers to content generated or significantly altered by artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning systems without a clear and prominent disclosure of its artificial nature. This definition is designed to capture the growing use of deepfakes in political and social contexts, ensuring that the technology itself is not a shield against legal liability for the human operators or organizations deploying it. Furthermore, the law defines 'High-Impact Content Producers' as individuals or entities whose digital presence exceeds a specific threshold of followers or engagement metrics, as determined annually by the Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA). These producers are held to a higher standard of due diligence than private citizens. 'Platform Providers' are defined as any digital infrastructure service, including social networks, messaging apps, and content hosting services, that facilitates the exchange of information. The law also distinguishes between 'Intentional Dissemination' (the deliberate spread of known falsehoods) and 'Negligent Proliferation' (the failure to verify information before sharing), providing a tiered approach to culpability that allows the judiciary to target both the original creators and the secondary amplifiers of prohibited content.

Governance and Institutional Framework

The institutional framework established by this law is centered around the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC), which serves as the highest policy-making body for digital affairs in Iran. Under this law, the SCC is empowered to issue binding directives that define the 'Red Lines' of news reporting and the specific criteria for what constitutes a threat to public tranquility. Supporting the SCC is the 'National Committee for Content Verification' (NCCV), a newly formed inter-agency body comprising representatives from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, the Ministry of Intelligence, the ICT Ministry, and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). The NCCV is tasked with the real-time monitoring of digital trends and the issuance of 'Correction Notices' to platforms and producers when untrue content is identified. On the enforcement side, the Law on Combating the Spread of Untrue News Content grants expanded powers to the Cyber Police (FATA) and the Judiciary's digital forensics units. These bodies are authorized to demand the immediate removal of content and the provision of metadata associated with the uploaders of 'untrue' news. The Ministry of ICT is responsible for the technical implementation of these orders, which may include the throttling of bandwidth to non-compliant platforms or the total blocking of services that fail to adhere to the verification protocols. This governance structure ensures a seamless pipeline from the identification of a perceived falsehood to the technical and legal suppression of the content, effectively integrating technical regulation with judicial enforcement.

Key Focus Areas

One of the primary focus areas of the legislation is the regulation of AI and automated systems. The law mandates that any news content generated by AI must include a permanent, non-removable digital watermark and a clear textual disclaimer. This is intended to prevent the use of 'synthetic personas' from influencing public opinion during sensitive periods, such as elections or economic crises. The law also focuses heavily on 'Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior' (CIB), prohibiting the use of botnets to artificially inflate the reach of specific news items. By targeting the infrastructure of virality, the Iranian government aims to reduce the impact of foreign-based influence operations and domestic dissent that utilizes automated tools to bypass traditional media gatekeepers. Another key focus is the 'Economic Stability' clause, which prohibits the publication of untrue news regarding the national currency, banking system, or commodity prices. Given the volatility of the Iranian Rial, the government views economic disinformation as a direct threat to national security. The law empowers the Central Bank of Iran to act as the sole arbiter of factual information regarding financial markets, and any report contradicting official figures can be classified as 'untrue news' subject to immediate prosecution. This focus extends to the healthcare sector, where the spread of non-sanctioned medical advice or 'false' reports on public health crises is strictly regulated to prevent social panic and institutional distrust.

Implementation Framework

The implementation of the law follows a multi-stage process involving registration, monitoring, and rapid response. All High-Impact Content Producers are required to register their digital identities with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, effectively ending anonymity for influential social media users. Once registered, these entities are integrated into a 'National Content Management System' where they receive real-time updates on prohibited topics and mandatory reporting guidelines. This system serves as a formal channel for the government to issue 'directives of truth,' which registered producers must follow to maintain their legal status and avoid administrative sanctions. Technically, the implementation relies on the 'National Information Network' (NIN), Iran's domestic internet infrastructure. The law requires platform providers to host their data locally or maintain a local representative who can be held legally accountable for content violations. For international platforms that refuse to comply, the law outlines a 'Graduated Response' strategy, starting with advertising bans and financial penalties for Iranian businesses using those platforms, and culminating in technical filtering. The implementation framework also includes the deployment of state-sponsored 'Fact-Checking' bots that automatically scan Persian-language content and flag potential violations to human moderators at the NCCV for final determination.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring under the 2025 law is continuous and data-driven. The Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) is tasked with maintaining a 'Digital Truth Index,' which tracks the prevalence of untrue news across different platforms and geographic regions within Iran. This index is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the law and to identify emerging threats or 'information gaps' that the state needs to fill with its own narratives. Platforms are required to submit quarterly transparency reports detailing the amount of content they have removed, the number of accounts suspended for spreading disinformation, and their compliance with government-issued correction notices. Evaluation of the law's impact is conducted annually by a joint committee of the Majlis and the Supreme Council of Cyberspace. This evaluation considers not only the reduction in 'untrue' content but also the impact on 'public psychological security.' The law includes provisions for 'Public Perception Surveys' to be conducted by state-affiliated research centers to determine if the citizenry feels more or less secure in the information they consume. However, critics note that the evaluation metrics are heavily skewed toward state security objectives rather than the protection of free expression or the objective accuracy of information, as the state remains the sole judge of what constitutes 'truth.'

Penalties, Liability, and Appeals

The Law on Combating the Spread of Untrue News Content introduces a harsh regime of penalties designed to act as a powerful deterrent. For individuals, penalties range from heavy fines (calculated as a percentage of their annual income or digital earnings) to imprisonment for terms of two to ten years, depending on the severity of the social disruption caused. In cases where the spread of untrue news is deemed to have 'endangered the lives of citizens' or 'facilitated foreign intervention,' the charges can be escalated to 'Corruption on Earth' (Mofsed-e-filarz), which carries the possibility of the death penalty under the Islamic Penal Code. This extreme escalation underscores the government's view of disinformation as a form of non-kinetic warfare. Corporate liability is equally stringent. Platform providers found in violation of the law face tiered sanctions, including the seizure of domestic assets, the revocation of operating licenses, and the permanent blocking of their services within Iran. The law also introduces 'Secondary Liability' for advertisers and sponsors who provide financial support to producers or platforms that consistently spread untrue news. While the law provides for an appeals process through the Specialized Court for Cybercrimes, the burden of proof often rests on the accused to demonstrate the factual basis of their content against the state's official determination. Appeals are generally limited to procedural errors rather than challenges to the state's definition of 'truth' in a particular instance.

Relationship to Other Instruments

This law functions as a specialized extension of several existing legal instruments in Iran. It directly complements the 'Computer Crimes Law' (2009) by providing more specific definitions for modern digital phenomena like AI and social media virality. It also interacts with the 'Press Law,' extending the regulations that previously applied only to traditional print and broadcast media to the entire digital sphere. By doing so, the government has closed the 'regulatory gap' that allowed digital influencers to operate with less oversight than traditional journalists. The law also references the 'Civil Liability Act' to allow individuals or state institutions harmed by untrue news to seek compensatory damages in civil court alongside criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the law is integrated with the 'User Protection Bill' (Tarh-e Siyanat) framework, which seeks to localize internet services and reduce dependence on foreign platforms. The Law on Combating the Spread of Untrue News Content provides the 'content-based' justification for the technical restrictions proposed in the Siyanat bill. It also aligns with the 'National Security Law,' as the dissemination of untrue news is now formally categorized as a threat to the 'territorial integrity and political independence' of the Islamic Republic. This web of interconnected laws ensures that the state has multiple legal avenues to prosecute information-related offenses, depending on the context and the identity of the actor involved.

International Alignment

The Law on Combating the Spread of Untrue News Content represents a significant departure from international human rights standards regarding freedom of expression and the 'Manila Principles' on intermediary liability. While many Western nations are grappling with disinformation through transparency and independent fact-checking, Iran's approach is characterized by centralized state control and criminalization. The law does not align with the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Iran is a party, particularly regarding the requirements for 'necessity and proportionality' in restricting speech. Instead, the law aligns with the 'Cyber Sovereignty' models championed by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), of which Iran is a member. In terms of regional cooperation, the law includes provisions for 'Mutual Legal Assistance' with friendly nations to track and prosecute individuals spreading untrue news from abroad. This is particularly relevant to the Iranian diaspora and foreign-based Persian-language media outlets. The law envisions a 'Joint Information Defense' mechanism with allies, allowing for the sharing of blacklists and the synchronization of narratives to counter 'Western information hegemony.' This international alignment is focused on creating a bloc of nations that reject the open-internet model in favor of a state-managed digital environment where information flow is strictly regulated to preserve domestic political stability.

Implementation Timeline

Compliance Checklist

Technical Standards for AI Watermarking