United States - California - Combat Deepfakes (AB 2655)
California AB 2655 - Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024
United States • California
RAI-US-CA-CA2DDXX-2024Partly blocked by court
In Kohls v. Bonta, a federal court held on August 20, 2025 that this law is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act as applied to X Corp. and Rumble, and permanently barred California's Attorney General and Secretary of State from enforcing it against them. Under a court order of August 28, 2025, those two officials will not enforce the law against any provider of an interactive computer service, such as Facebook, Instagram or YouTube, unless an appeals court vacates the judgment. The court did not decide whether the law violates the First Amendment.
The status shown describes the law itself, which has not been repealed. The court orders limit who can enforce it, and against whom.
- Order on Stipulation Regarding AB 2655 Enforcement · Kohls v. Bonta, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, 28 Aug 2025
- Order and Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction as to AB 2655 · Kohls v. Bonta, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, 20 Aug 2025
Checked against the court record on 11 Sep 2026 (govinfo.gov).
United States - California - Combat Deepfakes (AB 2655) is In Force in United States as of 10 Sep 2026, according to leginfo.legislature.ca.gov. It is currently partly blocked by a court; the notice above says what is blocked and for whom.
ActTransparency and DisclosureGovernance and OversightEnforcement and PenaltiesCalifornia's AB 2655 combats election-related deepfakes by requiring large online platforms to block or label deceptive AI-generated content during election periods.
Summary
California's AB 2655, the Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024, targets large online platforms to combat election-related deepfakes. Enacted on September 17, 2024, it mandates platforms to block or label materially deceptive AI-generated content during critical election periods, aiming to protect voters from manipulated media and ensure election integrity.
Full article
Read full text ↗Overview
The Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024, codified as California Assembly Bill 2655, represents a critical legislative response to the escalating threat of generative artificial intelligence (AI) in electoral processes. Enacted on September 17, 2024, and subsequently chaptered as Chapter 261 of the Statutes of 2024, this Act introduces a comprehensive framework aimed at mitigating the spread of materially deceptive digitally altered or created content, often referred to as deepfakes, on large online platforms during election cycles in California. The legislative intent behind AB 2655 is rooted in the recognition that AI-powered disinformation has the potential to severely compromise the integrity of elections by misleading voters and eroding public trust in democratic institutions. The Act specifically targets content that could falsely depict candidates, elected officials, or election processes, thereby influencing voter behavior or suppressing participation.
The scope of AB 2655 is narrowly tailored to address election-related deepfakes, focusing on the responsibilities of 'large online platforms' – defined as those with at least one million California users in the preceding 12 months. These platforms are now legally obligated to implement measures to either block or label specific types of AI-generated content during designated periods surrounding an election. This proactive approach is intended to prevent the widespread dissemination of fraudulent information that could significantly impact election outcomes. Beyond content moderation, the Act also establishes clear pathways for accountability, enabling various stakeholders, including individual residents, candidates, and governmental legal officers, to seek injunctive relief against platforms that fail to comply with its provisions. This dual emphasis on platform responsibility and robust enforcement mechanisms underscores California's commitment to safeguarding its electoral system from the novel challenges posed by advanced AI technologies.
Definitions
Central to the application and enforcement of the Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024 are several key definitions that delineate the scope of its provisions. One of the most crucial terms is "large online platform," which the Act defines as an online platform that has at least one million California users in the 12 months preceding the relevant election period. This threshold is designed to focus the regulatory burden on platforms with significant reach and potential impact on the California electorate, ensuring that the legislation targets entities capable of widespread content dissemination and that have the resources to implement the required moderation and reporting procedures. By setting a clear user-based criterion, the Act provides a quantifiable measure for determining which platforms fall under its jurisdiction, thereby offering clarity to both platforms and enforcement agencies.
Another fundamental definition is "materially deceptive content." This term refers to audio or visual media that is digitally created or modified, encompassing deepfakes and the output of chatbots, such that it would falsely appear to a reasonable person to be an authentic record of the content depicted in the media. Crucially, the definition explicitly excludes minor modifications that do not significantly alter the perceived contents or meaning of the original content. This distinction is vital for differentiating between genuinely misleading deepfakes and less impactful alterations, ensuring that the Act targets only the most egregious forms of deception. Furthermore, the Act provides specific exemptions for content that constitutes satire or parody, as well as for broadcasting stations and regularly published online newspapers, magazines, or other periodicals of general circulation that meet specified requirements. These exemptions are critical for protecting legitimate forms of expression and journalism, balancing the need to combat disinformation with constitutional free speech protections.
Governance and Institutional Framework
The governance and institutional framework for the Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024 primarily places responsibilities on large online platforms while empowering a range of governmental and individual actors for oversight and enforcement. Large online platforms, as defined by the Act, are the primary regulated entities, tasked with developing and implementing internal procedures to identify, block, or label materially deceptive content related to elections. This includes establishing clear mechanisms for California residents to report content that they believe violates the Act's provisions. The Act implicitly relies on these platforms to self-regulate and adhere to the established standards, necessitating internal policies, technological capabilities, and trained personnel to manage the influx of AI-generated content effectively. The success of the Act largely hinges on the diligence and technical proficiency of these platforms in executing their new obligations.
For external oversight and enforcement, the Act grants significant authority to several legal entities. Candidates for elected office, elected officials, elections officials, the Attorney General of California, and district attorneys or city attorneys are all authorized to seek injunctive relief against a large online platform for noncompliance with the Act. This broad grant of authority ensures multiple avenues for challenging non-compliance and provides a robust deterrent against platforms failing to meet their obligations. The Act further stipulates that actions seeking such injunctive relief shall be assigned precedence when filed in court, underscoring the urgency and importance of addressing deepfake deception in elections. This judicial prioritization mechanism is designed to facilitate swift legal action, recognizing that the impact of deepfakes can be time-sensitive, particularly in the immediate lead-up to and aftermath of an election. This multi-layered enforcement structure aims to create a strong accountability system for online platforms.
Key Focus Areas
The Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024 establishes several key focus areas to achieve its objective of safeguarding election integrity from AI-powered disinformation. A primary focus is the mandated blocking or labeling of materially deceptive content related to elections. Specifically, large online platforms are required to block the posting or sending of such content during specified periods before and after an election in California. This proactive blocking mechanism is intended to prevent the most egregious forms of deepfake deception from reaching the electorate. For other specified content that may not warrant outright blocking but is still deemed inauthentic, fake, or false, platforms are required to apply appropriate labels. This dual approach allows for a nuanced response to different levels of deceptive content, aiming to inform voters without necessarily removing all potentially misleading information, provided it is clearly identified as non-authentic.
Another significant focus area is the establishment of clear and accessible reporting procedures for California residents. The Act mandates that large online platforms develop and implement mechanisms through which residents can report content that they believe has not been blocked or labeled in compliance with the Act. This provision empowers individual citizens to participate in the oversight process, acting as a distributed network of monitors to help identify and flag potentially problematic content. By providing a formal channel for citizen complaints, the Act aims to create a more responsive and accountable system for content moderation. Furthermore, the Act's focus extends to ensuring timely judicial intervention. It authorizes various legal actors, including the Attorney General and local prosecutors, to seek injunctive relief against non-compliant platforms, with such actions receiving precedence in court. This expedited legal pathway is crucial for addressing deepfake-related issues quickly, given the rapid dissemination capabilities of online platforms and the time-sensitive nature of election campaigns.
Implementation Framework
The implementation framework for the Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024 places significant responsibility on large online platforms to integrate its requirements into their operational procedures. Upon the Act becoming operative, these platforms are expected to revise their terms of service, content moderation policies, and technical infrastructure to comply with the mandates. This includes developing and deploying advanced detection technologies capable of identifying materially deceptive digitally modified or created content, such as deepfakes and chatbot outputs, related to California elections. Platforms will need to establish clear internal protocols for evaluating reported content, making determinations on whether content should be blocked or labeled, and ensuring these actions are taken within the specified pre- and post-election periods. The Act necessitates a substantial investment by platforms in both human and technological resources to effectively manage the new regulatory landscape.
A critical component of the implementation framework involves the creation of robust reporting mechanisms for California residents. Large online platforms must establish user-friendly procedures that allow individuals to easily report content that they believe violates the Act's blocking or labeling requirements. These procedures should ideally include clear guidelines on what constitutes reportable content, how to submit a report, and what kind of response or action can be expected from the platform. The effectiveness of this citizen-centric reporting system will depend on its accessibility, transparency, and the platform's responsiveness to reported issues. Additionally, the Act’s implementation involves the judicial system, as it provides for expedited injunctive relief actions. This means that courts will need to prioritize cases brought under AB 2655, requiring judicial familiarity with the Act’s provisions and the technical aspects of deepfake deception. The overall framework emphasizes a collaborative approach where platforms are primarily responsible for internal compliance, supported by external oversight and enforcement avenues.
Monitoring and Evaluation
The Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024 does not explicitly detail a formal state-level monitoring and evaluation framework with specific metrics or reporting requirements for government agencies. However, the Act's design implicitly incorporates mechanisms that will allow for ongoing assessment of its effectiveness. The requirement for large online platforms to develop and implement procedures for California residents to report non-compliant content serves as a continuous feedback loop. The volume and nature of these reports, as well as the platforms' responses to them, could provide de facto data points for evaluating the Act's practical impact. An increase in successfully resolved reports might indicate effective platform compliance and content moderation, while a high volume of unresolved or persistent issues could signal areas where the Act's implementation needs strengthening or where platforms are falling short of their obligations.
Furthermore, the provisions for injunctive relief, allowing candidates, officials, and legal bodies to take platforms to court for non-compliance, will also contribute to an informal evaluation process. The number of such legal actions filed, their outcomes, and any judicial interpretations of the Act's provisions will offer insights into its enforceability and efficacy. While the Act does not mandate specific governmental reports on deepfake prevalence or platform compliance, the Attorney General's office, district attorneys, and city attorneys, in their role as potential litigants, will inherently be monitoring platform behavior and the landscape of election-related deepfakes. Over time, the collective experience of these enforcement bodies, coupled with public reporting data from platforms (if they choose to make it public, or if required by future regulation), could inform future legislative amendments or the development of more formal evaluation protocols to ensure the Act remains relevant and effective in an evolving technological environment.
Penalties, Liability, and Appeals
The Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024 primarily establishes a framework for civil enforcement rather than imposing direct criminal penalties or specific monetary fines for non-compliance on large online platforms. The core enforcement mechanism outlined in the Act is the authorization for various parties to seek injunctive relief against a non-compliant large online platform. This means that if a platform fails to block or label materially deceptive content as required, or fails to establish adequate reporting procedures for California residents, aggrieved parties can petition a court to order the platform to cease its non-compliant activities. The parties authorized to seek such relief are broad, including candidates for elected office, elected officials, elections officials, the Attorney General, and district attorneys or city attorneys. This broad standing ensures that multiple stakeholders have the legal means to hold platforms accountable for their obligations under the Act.
A significant aspect of the Act's enforcement provisions is the directive that actions seeking injunctive relief shall be assigned precedence when they are filed in court. This prioritization is critical given the time-sensitive nature of election cycles and the rapid spread of online disinformation. By fast-tracking these cases, the Act aims to ensure that remedies can be sought and implemented quickly enough to prevent or mitigate the harm caused by deepfake deception before or during an election. While the Act does not specify a formal appeals process within its text, any injunctive order issued by a court would be subject to standard judicial appeal procedures under California law. Platforms found in violation of an injunction could face further legal consequences, including contempt of court charges, if they fail to comply with judicial orders. This structure places the burden of compliance squarely on the platforms, with the threat of court-ordered intervention serving as a primary deterrent against non-adherence to the Act's mandates.
Relationship to Other Instruments
The Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024 does not operate in a vacuum but rather integrates with and builds upon existing legal frameworks within California. Specifically, the Act amends Section 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure and adds Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 20510) to Division 20 of the Elections Code. The amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure reinforces the precedence given to election-related legal proceedings, extending this expedited treatment to actions brought under AB 2655 for injunctive relief against online platforms. This ensures that legal challenges related to deepfake deception during elections receive prompt judicial attention, aligning with the urgency typically afforded to matters impacting democratic processes.
Furthermore, AB 2655 extends and strengthens existing California law concerning deceptive audio or visual media in elections. Prior to this Act, existing law, which was set to expire on January 1, 2027, prohibited the distribution of materially deceptive audio or visual media of a candidate with actual malice and intent to injure reputation or deceive voters within 60 days of an election, unless a disclosure of manipulation was included. AB 2655 effectively builds upon this by introducing new obligations for large online platforms to proactively block or label content, rather than solely relying on post-distribution penalties. It shifts some of the responsibility from individual distributors to the platforms that host and disseminate such content, particularly during critical election periods. The Act also incorporates additional changes to Section 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure proposed by AB 2839, indicating a coordinated legislative effort to address election integrity.
International Alignment
The Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024 is a state-level initiative within the United States and, as such, does not explicitly outline provisions for direct international alignment or cross-border cooperation with other nations or international bodies. Its focus is squarely on safeguarding election integrity within California's jurisdiction. However, the issues it addresses—the proliferation of AI-generated disinformation and deepfakes in democratic processes—are global concerns. The legislative findings within the Act acknowledge the unprecedented challenges posed by generative artificial intelligence to information ecosystems, a sentiment echoed by policymakers and regulators worldwide.
While the Act itself does not mandate international cooperation, the problem it seeks to solve is part of a broader global effort to regulate AI-generated content in political campaigns. Other jurisdictions, such as the European Union with its Digital Services Act (DSA), have also introduced measures to mandate transparency in digital advertising and protect users from deceptive content. Although AB 2655 does not formally align with these international instruments, it contributes to the growing body of global regulations aimed at addressing the societal impacts of advanced AI, particularly in sensitive areas like elections. The Act's specific framework for disclosure and content moderation in political contexts, albeit at a state level, reflects a common recognition of the need for robust safeguards against AI-driven manipulation that is being observed across various democratic nations.
Implementation Timeline
| Milestone | Date | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Introduced | 2024-02-14 | Assembly Bill No. 2655 introduced by Assembly Members Berman and Pellerin. |
| Amended in Assembly | 2024-03-21, 2024-04-01, 2024-04-24 | Initial amendments made during the Assembly review process. |
| Passed State Assembly | 2024-05-22 | Passed Assembly by a vote of 56 to 1. |
| Amended in Senate | 2024-08-27 | Amended version passed State Senate by a vote of 31 to 9. |
| Concurrence Vote Passed (Assembly) | 2024-08-28 | Assembly concurred with Senate amendments by a vote of 59 to 8. |
| Approved by Governor | 2024-09-17 | Governor Gavin Newsom approved the bill. |
| Chaptered by Secretary of State | 2024-09-17 | Chaptered as Chapter 261, Statutes of 2024. |
| Operative Date | 2025-01-01 | Typically, California bills approved in a calendar year become operative on January 1 of the following year, unless otherwise specified within the bill text. |
Sources and References
| Source | Type |
|---|---|
| California Legislative Information - AB 2655 Bill Text (Chaptered) | Legal |
| LegiScan - CA AB2655 (2023-2024 Regular Session) | Government |
| BillTrack50 - CA AB2655 | Government |
| Justia - California Code of Civil Procedure Section 35 | Legal |
| Justia - California Elections Code Chapter 7 | Legal |
Read this article-by-article
Plain-English breakdown of 7 key articles, with cross-jurisdiction equivalents where applicable.
Requirements for a company
What an organisation has to do under United States - California - Combat Deepfakes (AB 2655), at a glance. Not legal advice — the table below gives the provision and deadline for each item.
Must do
8- Determine if your platform has at least one million California users in the preceding 12 months.Online platforms operating in California.
- Implement systems to block the posting or sending of materially deceptive AI-generated content related to elections.Large online platforms.
- Develop procedures to label certain additional content as inauthentic, fake, or false during election periods.Large online platforms.
- Create and maintain clear, accessible procedures for California residents to report non-compliant content.Large online platforms.
- Revise terms of service, content moderation policies, and technical infrastructure to comply with the Act.Large online platforms.
- Ensure blocking and labeling measures are active and effective during specific pre- and post-election windows.Large online platforms.
- +2 more in the table below
Must not do
0Nothing in this category.
Should do
0Nothing in this category.
Should not do
0Nothing in this category.
Who must do what
The obligations under United States - California - Combat Deepfakes (AB 2655), most serious first. Not legal advice — verify against the official text before relying on it.
| # | Who | Requirement | By when | Where | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Online platforms operating in California. | Determine if your platform has at least one million California users in the preceding 12 months. “online platform that has at least one million California users in the 12 months preceding the relevant election period.” | Before any election period | — | Critical |
| 2 | Large online platforms. | Implement systems to block the posting or sending of materially deceptive AI-generated content related to elections. “block the posting or sending of such content during specified periods before and after an election in California.” | During specified periods before and after an election | — | Critical |
| 3 | Large online platforms. | Develop procedures to label certain additional content as inauthentic, fake, or false during election periods. “platforms are required to apply appropriate labels for content that may not warrant outright blocking but is still deemed inauthentic, fake, or false.” | During specified periods before and after an election | — | Critical |
| 4 | Large online platforms. | Create and maintain clear, accessible procedures for California residents to report non-compliant content. “establish clear mechanisms for California residents to report content that they believe violates the Act's provisions.” | Jan 1, 2025 | — | Critical |
| 5 | Large online platforms. | Revise terms of service, content moderation policies, and technical infrastructure to comply with the Act. “platforms are expected to revise their terms of service, content moderation policies, and technical infrastructure to comply.” | Jan 1, 2025 | — | Critical |
| 6 | Large online platforms. | Ensure blocking and labeling measures are active and effective during specific pre- and post-election windows. “ensuring these actions are taken within the specified pre- and post-election periods.” | During specified periods before and after an election | — | Critical |
| 7 | Large online platforms. | Properly identify and exempt content that qualifies as satire, parody, or legitimate news periodicals. “Act provides specific exemptions for content that constitutes satire or parody, as well as for broadcasting stations and regularly published online newspapers.” | Before any election period | — | Important |
| 8 | Large online platforms. | Allocate sufficient technical and human resources for content detection, moderation, and report processing. “The Act necessitates a substantial investment by platforms in both human and technological resources.” | Jan 1, 2025 | — | Important |
Enforcement actions and court cases
1 entry recordedPublic enforcement actions and court cases involving United States - California - Combat Deepfakes (AB 2655). They show how the law is applied in practice and whether a court has limited it.
- Court rulingAug 29, 2025
Kohls v. Bonta
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
Sector: Online platforms and political content creators
In Kohls v. Bonta, consolidated with suits by X Corp., Rumble and The Babylon Bee, a federal court ruled against both of California's 2024 election deepfake laws. It entered final judgment on August 20, 2025 that AB 2655, the Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act, is preempted by Section 230 as applied to X Corp. and Rumble, and a stipulated order of August 28 bars the Attorney General and Secretary of State from enforcing it against any provider of an interactive computer service, including Facebook, Instagram and YouTube, unless an appeals court vacates that judgment. On August 29, 2025 it held that AB 2839, which restricts materially deceptive election content, facially violates the First Amendment with no part severable, and permanently enjoined the Attorney General and Secretary of State from enforcing it against the plaintiffs, Christopher Kohls, The Babylon Bee and Kelly Chang Rickert.
Source ↗
Related Regulations
United States - California - AI Disclosure in Political Ads (AB 2355)
United States95% similar
United States - California - Deceptive Election Content (AB 2839)
United States94% similar
California AI Transparency Amendments
United States94% similar
United States - California - Deceptive Media Regulation (AB 972/2022)
United States93% similar
More AI regulation in United States
AI regulation in United States: full overview
- United States - California - AI Training Data Transparency (AB 2013)
- United States - California - Deceptive Media in Elections (AB 730)
- California AI Oversight Order
- United States - California - AI-Generated Image Crimes (SB 926)
- United States - California - Chatbot Disclosure Requirements (SB 243)
- United States - California - AI Transparency Act (SB 53)
- United States - California - Deepfake Image Regulation (SB 981)
- California AV Testing and Deployment Rules
© Regulations.AI using Gemini 2.5 Flash · updated on 6 Jan 2026 · reviewed against official sources on 10 Sep 2026